Afghanistan War Effects on America Essay

After the monstrous terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, almost the entire human community, including the leaders of Muslim countries, condemned these terrorist acts. And that is understandable. Terrorism cannot be justified under any guise or pretext. This position is also taken by veterans of the war in Afghanistan.

It should also be borne in mind that by the beginning of the XXI century. Afghanistan has turned into a huge base of concentration of international terrorists, violent extremists, capable of finally blowing up not only the Afghan society, casting it into the cave age, but also destabilizing the military-political situation in the Middle East and Central Asia as a whole. A considerable threat also arose for Pakistan itself. The interests of many countries coincided in eliminating this common threat.

The number of US troops in Afghanistan has been increased. Currently, about 56 thousand American soldiers serve there as part of the operation.

In addition, a contingent of 14,000 NATO troops has joined the anti-terrorist efforts in Afghanistan as part of the “international security support forces.” The officially proclaimed goal of the ISAF is the partnership of civilian and military experts in rebuilding Afghanistan and providing practical assistance in creating the national security forces of this state. The Bush administration has pledged to Afghanistan after 9/11. But she pursued a defensive strategy, since it was believed that, given the size of the available troops, the enemy’s potential and historical experience, such a strategy was the best solution, especially given the fact that the Pentagon was almost immediately reoriented to the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. Toward the end of the term, the Bush administration began to investigate – under the influence of General David Petraeus, who had developed a strategy in Iraq – the possibility of some sort of political reconciliation in Afghanistan.

Obama changed his strategy in Afghanistan as follows: he moved from a completely defensive strategy to a mixed strategy of selective attack and defense, and transferred additional troops to Afghanistan (although the size of the US troops is still far from the size of the Soviet army when it lost its own Afghan war ) Thus, the essence of Obama’s policies remains the same as Bush’s, with the exception of a limited number of offensive operations. A major change since Obama came to the White House has been a change in the position of Pakistanis who pursue more aggressive policies (or at least they want to seem more aggressive) towards the Taliban and al-Qaeda, at least within their own borders. But even so, Obama’s basic strategy remains the same as Bush’s: to gain a foothold in Afghanistan until the political situation evolves until a political agreement can be reached.

Obama unveiled a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In order to combat terrorism in the region, in particular the destruction of al-Qaeda, the US President proposed to further increase the Afghan contingent of the United States by four thousand people. Meanwhile, Fox News reporters drew attention to the fact that Obama’s strategy had much in common with former President George W. Bush’s Afghan strategy.

An analysis conducted by experts from different countries of the world shows that the real goals of the United States and NATO in this country are to organize their own military, geostrategic, geopolitical and geo-economic bridgehead in the center of Eurasia, to deploy a powerful network of military bases in Afghanistan and the entire Middle East.

Moreover, maintaining intense instability and tension in Afghanistan, the presence of constant threats are literally a gift to the Pentagon, allowing us to annually demand from Congress a systematic increase in defense spending, keeping afloat the key enterprises of the country’s military-industrial complex. The overwhelming part of the financial costs of the campaign in Afghanistan is specifically overstated for the purpose of covert state subsidies to the enterprises of the American defense industry, and the funds of the United States taxpayers, therefore, do not go beyond the economy of the overseas superpower.

This, of course, is in the interests of the United States, especially in a situation of deep financial crisis.

In addition, the territory of Afghanistan today has been transformed by Washington and its allies into a real testing ground for testing modern types of weapons and developing new methods of waging so-called “irregular” wars.

For example, from the very beginning of the invasion of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan around the airfields of Shindand and Bagram, intensive construction work began with the construction of numerous ground and underground structures, which suggests the creation of superbases with some “cities” hidden under the surface of the earth. Today, these airdromes have been turned into universal military airbases equipped with air and space tracking systems that allow controlling the air navigation space of practically all of Eurasia.

But most importantly, because of its geographical position, Afghanistan is a unique positional area for the United States and NATO to host strategic military installations and strike groups, a kind of gigantic land carrier. In other words, Afghanistan today poses the same danger to the states of the region as in 1962 Cuba posed for the United States during the Caribbean crisis.

Instability in Afghanistan allows the United States to maintain constant tension along the borders of China, India, Iran, destabilize the states of Central Asia, thereby creating a constant and growing threat to the states of the region. The addition of military bases in Central Asia to military bases and groupings of the US armed forces in Japan, South Korea and some other countries of the Asia-Pacific region provides America with control from the continental part of the Asian continent, as well as from the Pacific and Indian Oceans, over the main strategic targets of almost all Asian countries.

In addition, the US military presence can be used to manipulate regional contradictions and to support various organizations in order to influence the governments of the countries of the region.

The heads of the foreign affairs agencies of NATO member countries at a meeting in Tallinn recognized that Afghanistan is likely to face security problems for several years, although the Western coalition forces have been able to achieve “serious success” and may begin this year a “process of transferring responsibilities on providing security to the government of Afghanistan. ” Moreover, according to the Secretary General of the alliance, A. F. Rasmussen, the withdrawal of NATO troops from the country will occur gradually and “will not be quick,” since the coalition forces will leave Afghan territory “only after completing their mission.” NATO also does not expect that “Afghanistan will try to meet impossible standards,” but they expect and work “to create Afghan security forces, armed forces and police that can protect people and inspire confidence in the capabilities of these structures.” The main slogan of the mission of the North Atlantic Alliance in Afghanistan was proclaimed: “more opportunities for Afghans and more their leadership role.” As a measure to support the development of the Afghan economy and create new jobs, the Western Allies intend to purchase mainly local goods for their troops in the country.

US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan R. Holbrook said on April 19 that the US administration is aimed at strengthening relations with the government of Afghan President H. Karzai in every possible way, and a “vast plan of active work” with the Kabul authorities has been developed in Washington.

There was a lot of talk in this connection that the United States would pay much more attention to Central Asia, referring to a number of supposedly important components of the new US foreign policy, which Barack Obama intends to pursue primarily with regard to Afghanistan.

It was mentioned in connection with this and the expansion of the military presence of NATO and US forces in Afghanistan, and the importance of delivering military and civilian cargo through Central Asian countries, and various kinds of “energy combinations

Speaking about the “players” in Central Asia, the expert noted that there are few of them, including the Central Asian countries themselves, and that, in his opinion, the strong “players” in the region are Russia and China. The United States is not going to leave Central Asia; moreover, recently their position here has even strengthened after they revised their policy towards Afghanistan. Moreover, the United States understands the need for cooperation with key countries in the region for the successful implementation of its policy in Afghanistan.

An analysis conducted by experts from different countries of the world shows that the real goals of the United States and NATO in this country are to organize their own military, geostrategic, geopolitical and geo-economic bridgehead in the center of Eurasia, to deploy a powerful network of military bases in Afghanistan and the entire Middle East.

At the same time, the war on terrorism is just an excuse for building up and justifying the timeless presence of the US and NATO military machines in the region. The events of September 11 and the outbreak of the “war on international terrorism” enabled Washington to create at least 19 new military bases in the Middle East and Central Asia. As a result, the US and NATO forces first appeared on the territory of post-Soviet states.

One often hears that the Americans and NATO all the same do not control the situation outside their military bases and cannot defeat the drug mafia. But at the same time, almost no one asks the question: do the American military and their allies want to control anything in Afghanistan, except their bases, and is the fight against the drug threat included in their tasks?

Moreover, maintaining intense instability and tension in Afghanistan, the presence of constant threats are literally a gift to the Pentagon, allowing us to annually demand from Congress a systematic increase in defense spending, keeping afloat the key enterprises of the country’s military-industrial complex. The overwhelming part of the financial costs of the campaign in Afghanistan is specifically overstated for the purpose of covert state subsidies to the enterprises of the American defense industry, and the funds of the United States taxpayers, therefore, do not go beyond the economy of the overseas superpower. This, of course, is in the interests of the United States, especially in a situation of deep financial crisis.

In addition, the territory of Afghanistan today has been transformed by Washington and its allies into a real testing ground for testing modern types of weapons and developing new methods of waging so-called “irregular” wars.

For example, from the very beginning of the invasion of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan around the airfields of Shindand and Bagram, intensive construction work began with the construction of numerous ground and underground structures, which suggests the creation of superbases with some “cities” hidden under the surface of the earth. Today, these airdromes have been turned into universal military airbases equipped with air and space tracking systems that allow controlling the air navigation space of practically all of Eurasia. / 36 /

But most importantly, because of its geographical position, Afghanistan is a unique positional area for the United States and NATO to host strategic military installations and strike groups, a kind of gigantic land carrier. In other words, Afghanistan today poses the same danger to the states of the region as in 1962 Cuba posed for the United States during the Caribbean crisis.

Instability in Afghanistan allows the United States to maintain constant tension along the borders of China, India, Iran, destabilize the states of Central Asia, thereby creating a constant and growing threat to the states of the region. The addition of military bases in Central Asia to military bases and groupings of the US armed forces in Japan, South Korea and some other countries of the Asia-Pacific region provides America with control from the continental part of the Asian continent, as well as from the Pacific and Indian Oceans, over the main strategic targets of almost all Asian countries.

Analysts have repeatedly expressed the view that US military bases in Central Asia, along with US forces in South Korea and Japan, can become at least a factor of powerful military pressure on Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan and India, especially in the event of an aggravation of military geopolitical situation.

In addition, the US military presence can be used to manipulate regional contradictions and to support various organizations in order to influence the governments of the countries of the region.

The heads of the foreign affairs agencies of NATO member countries at a meeting in Tallinn recognized that Afghanistan is likely to face security problems for several years, although the Western coalition forces have been able to achieve “serious success” and may begin this year a “process of transferring responsibilities on providing security to the government of Afghanistan. ” Moreover, according to the Secretary General of the alliance, A. F. Rasmussen, the withdrawal of NATO troops from the country will occur gradually and “will not be quick,” because the coalition forces will leave Afghan territory “only after completing their mission.” NATO also does not expect that “Afghanistan will try to meet impossible standards,” but they expect and work “to create Afghan security forces, armed forces and police that can protect people and inspire confidence in the capabilities of these structures.” The main slogan of the mission of the North Atlantic Alliance in Afghanistan was proclaimed: “more opportunities for Afghans and more their leadership role.” As a measure to support the development of the Afghan economy and create new jobs, the Western Allies intend to purchase mainly local goods for their troops in the country.

US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan R. Holbrook said the US administration aims to strengthen relations with the government of Afghan President H. Karzai in every way, and in Washington a “vast plan of active work” with the Kabul authorities has been developed

There was a lot of talk in this connection that the United States would pay much more attention to Central Asia, referring to a number of supposedly important components of the new US foreign policy that Barack Obama intends to pursue, especially with regard to Afghanistan.

Mentioned in this regard, the expansion of the military presence of NATO and US forces in Afghanistan, and the importance of delivery there through Central Asian countries military and civilian cargoes, and various kinds of “energy combinations” in which exactly the states of this region (especially those accessing the Caspian) are important for the whole of American foreign policy.
And yet, in all these assessments and predictions, there is some artificial exaggeration of the importance of Central Asia for today’s foreign policy of the United States. In fact, this region is important for them, but not so much that leading American politicians rush to deal with its problems as a matter of priority. Indeed, the Obama administration is full of much more important matters in other regions of the world (not to mention the difficult internal tasks, which must also be solved as quickly as possible), rather than plunging “in a big way” into Central Asian affairs.

With the beginning of the expansion of the Afghan operation by NATO coalition forces, again, both American and European experts began to criticize the White House for allegedly not having a clear strategy for Central Asia, and without it, again, supposedly, the United States would never win any the mythical “big game” around this region.

The judgments of such a plan are extremely erroneous and do not take into account the priorities that the American administration of B. Obama actually faces in foreign policy today. No matter what the “big games” are attributed to America, that in Central Asia, in the Caspian Sea around energy projects, all these topics are actually on the “diplomatic periphery” of the White House in comparison with many other international issues.

After Obama took office, the United States began to act more pragmatically and wisely in world affairs. Compared to Bush and his team, which was ready to “teach the mind” of everyone in any corner of the world, now Americans are trying not to intervene at all where it is more reasonable to conduct a dialogue and resolve disputed issues through negotiations.

In addition, the real problem for the United States is posed today by countries that threaten the world order with their unpredictable and defiant behavior (such as Iran or North Korea), but by no means the Central Asian states, where the situation is relatively stable and where the United States’s position is at least not at risk.

Today, not one of the countries of Central Asia occupies any position that is challenging in relation to America. And even the “Manas demarche” of Kyrgyzstan to close the air base in Washington was by no means perceived as some kind of long-term rejection of cooperation with the United States, both politically and economically.

Washington continues to believe that the Central Asian states are in the orbit of Russia’s strong, primarily political influence, and Chinese economic penetration in the region has recently been accelerated. But the American leadership does not see anything particularly terrible for the foreign political interests of the United States, and does not plan to take any urgent measures to “save the American presence” in the region.

The United States administration is not very worried about the fact that today no openly “pro-American leader” is in power in any Central Asian country. Washington is not going to participate in the “imposition of power” in Central Asia, those who have either studied in the United States. or is closely connected with American business interests, so nothing that America cannot survive without (even in terms of strategic interests in Afghanistan), no country in the region can give it.

As long as Afghanistan is unstable, there will be no peace in Central Asia. Hence the common foreign policy line of the United States is formed in the region not only of Central, but also of Asia Minor, which now consists in ensuring that at least elementary stability reigns here. And here the United States is ready to accept help and assistance from everyone who will be interested in this. First of all, this concerns the situation around Afghanistan, where thousands of NATO troops only purely minimally keep the country from chaos and unrest.

That is why it is important for the United States to involve not only the countries of Central Asia in its efforts to maintain normal relations with it (this is by no means just the right to fly-carry cargo of coalition forces, but also financial, other material assistance to Kabul, training of Afghan personnel and much more) but also China.

For example, China is the largest investor in Afghanistan today, paving roads and developing one of the largest copper mines in Asia. In appearance for American business and strategic interests for Washington, all this looks like a concession to the Chinese. But in fact, for the United States today it is much more important that the situation in Afghanistan normalizes as soon as possible, and then large-scale transport and energy projects can be implemented in the entire region.

So the main priorities of US official policy in Central Asia are:

1. Enhanced cooperation with Central Asian states to support the efforts of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as to establish stability in the region. This task includes the development of bilateral relations between the countries of Central Asia and the United States, as well as ensuring the reliability of NDN.

2. Development and diversification of energy resources in the region. Central Asia has a large number of energy resources that need to be developed to establish international energy security. Central Asian countries should take advantage of international experience and strive to diversify trade relations with different countries.

3. Support for political liberalization and respect for human rights. According to George Krol, the Obama administration is not trying to impose political principles on the countries of Central Asia, but this does not mean that the United States will not continue to actively support democratic rule and respect for human rights. The United States understands that political change takes time. At the same time, Washington hopes that the chairmanship of Kazakhstan in the OSCE next year will contribute to the democratic processes in the region as a whole.

4. Promoting the development of a market economy and economic reform. The US government aims to help Central Asian countries establish trade relations with each other, as well as help develop trade relations through the NDN.

5. Prevent the complete collapse of states. The authorities of the countries of Central Asia are experiencing difficulties in fulfilling their direct duties to the population, which in turn can lead to a partial or complete disintegration of states. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular are increasingly reminiscent of “failed states.” Through economic and agricultural development, the US government seeks to avert a political and economic crisis.

For all Central Asian states, a new, much more complex stage of the “big game” has begun, associated with plans for geopolitically restructuring the region and establishing (direct or indirect) control over its rich resources. It is in this context that one should consider many seemingly unrelated events, including the growth of the external military presence, the sporadic activity of radical Islamist groups, and the well-known events in Andijan and Bishkek.

The efforts of the United States in the Central Asian direction are complex, provide for a clear synchronization of the actions of political, diplomatic, military, information-analytical and “non-governmental” structures. In 1997, in her sensational article, Madeleine Albright expressed the absolutely logical, from the point of view of her country’s interests, idea that the United States should manage the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In August 2002, a famous specialist Art. Blank presented analytical material with the distinctive title: Restructuring Inner Asia. He focused on the development of communications in the former Soviet Central Asia and on the territories bordering it, seeing this as the only opportunity for political, economic and social transformations that can eliminate geographical isolation, which contributes to maintaining social and economic backwardness and ineffective political regimes here. Then, several more developments became public, where Frederick Starr’s study, “Partnership of Greater Central Asia for Afghanistan and Its Neighbors,” published by the Hopkins Joint Transatlantic Center for Research and Policy in March 2005, deserves special attention. In this document, Afghanistan is called the “core” of the macro-region “Big Central Asia”, around which it is necessary to build the entire regional geopolitics. The idea of ​​”Greater Central Asia” claims to be a conceptual and ideological substantiation of US policy in the region, being its new interpretation and at the same time logically continuing Washington’s previous political line.

Many steps taken by the American administration since 2005 indicate that the key elements of Frederick Starr’s analytical research have been adopted.

So, approximately in 2007, after negotiations with one of the Afghan-Pakistani religious leaders Fazl ur Rehman in Islamabad, US Assistant Secretary of State for Central and South Asian Affairs Richard Boucher announced the US administration’s vision of “stable and democratic Central Asia.” Such a vision, according to R. Boucher, suggests that this region will be increasingly connected with South Asia (but by no means with Russia). “The creation of connecting links with the south, complementing existing ties with the north, east and west, is in the interests of the Central Asian states,” ITAR-TASS quoted R.Baucher. According to him, the US goal should be “to help revive the old ties between South and Central Asia, to help form new ties in the areas of trade, transport, democracy, energy and communications.”

The events of 2007 showed that the United States, using NATO as a traditional military-political cover, is consistently, skillfully and purposefully realizing its goals in the Central Asian region. Without exaggeration, the best American cadres have been thrown to Central Asia: it is enough to recall the architect of the Balkan policy of the United States, and now – the US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke. US actions are dynamic and promptly adjust their priorities while maintaining long-term strategic interests. For example, the recent statements by B. Obama about the plan for the gradual withdrawal of American troops from the territory of Afghanistan contradict his earlier statements that the military forces of the Western alliance will remain in this country for a long time to come. An inexperienced observer may get the impression that the United States lacks a holistic strategy, even some throwings. If, however, this were so, then what would be happening there would not have happened in Afghanistan.

At the same time, the market of Central Asian countries is not particularly important for the United States either in terms of the supply of goods and services here. The entire population of the region is about 50 million people, and the maximum that America can really supply here for the future is technologies for the energy sector, transportation equipment and engineering products, as well as communications, plus some types of weapons.

In fact, only Kazakhstan has Turkmenistan with sufficient funds to acquire all of this, and therefore it is much more important for the United States, primarily through diplomatic and political methods, to maintain stability and predictability in these republics. Nevertheless, the rest of the points (including some kind of “big strategy” attributed by the USA to various kinds of political scientists in the region) actually concern Washington only indirectly.

It should be noted that the countries of Central Asia themselves do not at all develop in their foreign policy any “priority-oriented” course towards rapprochement with the United States. All of them pursue a so-called multi-vector policy, striving not to “lean against” either the USA, Russia, or China. That is why no pro-American mood or desire to somehow draw attention to itself in the eyes of Washington is outlined in the capitals of the states of the region.

Another question is that in connection with the expansion of the Afghan operation by NATO coalition forces, a number of Central Asian countries have a chance to “make America pleasant” – to help with various kinds of transport corridors for delivering goods to Afghanistan, provide the opportunity to place supply or storage points on its territory, and also (as in the case of Uzbekistan) allow NATO aircraft to use their airfields.

Naturally, Washington will not forget such “good deeds” from the Central Asian states (even if the Americans from the same country were demonstratively exposed before), but the United States does not plan to do anything “extremely partner” with these states in the future.

The fact that Central Asia is still not a priority in US foreign policy today, many observers for some reason explain the lack of a special “shuttle representative” appointed by the president of the country who would constantly keep his hand on the “pulse of the region” and thereby have directly the opportunity to inform Obama about the events taking place there.

Meanwhile, as the practice of the American “foreign policy machine” shows, in order to give priority to a particular region, the White House does not need to appoint or publicly instruct a particular official to “keep an eye” on Central Asia .

So, more recently, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was the “ambassador on special Central Asian missions” to the White House administration. After the start of the military operation in Afghanistan, he was not only a frequent visitor to the Central Asian capitals, but also truly imbued with the spirit of this region.

At the same time, the United States is not going to leave Central Asia at all, just as it does not plan to surrender this region to either Russia or China. And the expectations that Washington could cooperate with Moscow and Beijing in this region, in my opinion, are simply groundless. The Americans will continue to bend their “democratic line” in Central Asia and expect from the region not at all primitive “pro-American behavior”, but a “minimal headache” for themselves in terms of both economic and political interaction with him.

Great expectations exist in Central Asia about its possible visit by US President Obama, and in the very near future. He already said that he plans to visit this region, and Kazakhstan even officially invited the current owner of the White House to pay a visit to Astana. But according to diplomatic practice, certain conditions will have to meet such a voyage, without which the first persons of America usually do not go abroad with visits.

In addition to the United States, China, the European Union, to a certain extent Iran and Turkey, pursue an active policy in Central Asia, so the next stage of the “big game” promises to be very difficult for Moscow. The fact that the Kyrgyz authorities have achieved the withdrawal of the US Air Force base at Manas Airport (with its multifaceted activities) can be only a tactical success, which, if it does not develop, will inevitably turn into a strategic defeat. Symptoms of this are already evident, and the policy of Russia, which authorized the American presence in Central Asia after September 11, 2001 under the unreasonable pretext of “fighting international terrorism and the drug business,” continues to suffer from inconsistency. The drug business is flourishing as never before – according to the head of the State Drug Control Department of Russia V. Ivanov, “since the introduction of the US and NATO military contingents into Afghanistan, the harvests of opium poppy have increased by more than 40 times, and significant volumes are sent to countries in the Central Asian region and Russia, causing devastating consequences of our population ”, and 92% of heroin in the world is of Afghan origin10. The so-called “international terrorism” is more likely as an instrument of a possible future reformatting of the political field of the states of the region. “A real threat to the stability and security of the Central Asian region, including potential challenges from Islamic radicalism, is likely to arise at the next transitional stage, when new repressive regimes will be replaced by new leaders,” writes S. Seibol, an American researcher, arguing with those authors who believe that the spread of Islamic “fundamentalism” in Central Asia is a threat today.

As for the “Afghan transit” of the United States, for the implementation of the purposes of which the Central Asian states are used as a “jumping platform”, it poses serious problems. It is unlikely that the assurances of the exclusively non-military nature of the transported cargo can reassure, given the pace that modern military infrastructure is being built to the south of Panj. However, Moscow enters into relevant agreements with NATO, and it is not surprising that its CSTO allies – Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – also agree with the Americans on the so-called “non-military transit” during the visit of R. Boucher to these states in April. Judging by some reports, the corresponding transportation is already underway. Obviously, here we are talking about a proposal that no one can refuse; in addition, Tajikistan (recall: this state, culturally historically close to Iran, has a long border with Afghanistan) is potentially regarded as the location of the new US military base in Central Asia. Relevant consultations began under the previous administration of George W. Bush. The American representative did not ignore Turkmenistan either, and his meetings in Ashgabat coincided in time with a certain cooling of the Turkmen-Russian relations connected with the accident that occurred on the Davletbat-Dariyalyk section of the Central Asia-Center gas pipeline. The gas conflict between Russia and Turkmenistan will be used in every way by the interested Western circles to revive the Nabucco project, and the final advantage of one side or another is not obvious. On April 16, in Ashgabat, in the presence of Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, the German RWE AG CEO Jurgen Grossmann and the head of the Turkmen State Agency for the Management and Use of Hydrocarbon Resources Yagshigeldy Kakaev signed a long-term agreement on transporting Turkmen gas to Europe.

On the same day, Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, said in Ashgabat that “the US government attaches particular importance to the development of multifaceted cooperation with Central Asian countries, and a qualitatively new stage has begun in relations with Turkmenistan.”

Thus, President Obama’s foreign policy toward Central Asia is only looming. Therefore, while it will be more correct to talk about the contours, and not about a holistic policy in relation to the region. This is due to the fact that President Obama is now defining US policy regarding the main problems of the modern world and is looking for answers to the main US security challenges. It takes time, thought, nerves and endurance. For him, now in Eurasia, it is important to attract Russia and China to a better partnership with a soft approach, to find new useful solutions for the entire post-Soviet space. And all in order to successfully complete the strategically important planned operation in Afghanistan. Failure in this country can seriously shake the weight of the United States in international affairs.